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Enhancing community resilience: Assessing the role that black, Asian and 
minority ethnic law enforcement (LEA) staff associations and networks can play 
in the fight against radicalisation. 
 
Bankole Cole and Nadia Habashi  
 
10.1 Introduction  
In the fight against radicalisation and countering violent extremism (CVE), an 
emerging approach, that of community resilience, is garnering plaudits in Europe (see 
European Commission 2015) and other parts of the world, for example, in Kenya 
(Van Metre  2016) and the USA (Ellis and Abdi 2017; Van Metre and Calder 2016; 
Weine et al. 2013; The White House, Office of the Press Secretary 2011). The push 
for community resilience as an approach to tackling radicalisation stems in part from 
(I) the recognition of the fact that many people who are similarly experiencing social, 
economic or political adversities; or those who support or accept the ideologies or 
religious doctrines that others have quoted to justify extremist violence are not, 
themselves, prone to violence, and (II) the belief that there are elements within 
communities ‘at risk’ that are counter violence whose energies can be harnessed to 
ensure peace. Accordingly, a public heath approach to dealing with violence is 
gaining grounds that sees the problem as a disease, shifting the emphasis from 
traditional law enforcement per se to understanding the root causes of the problem 
and adopting a ‘progressive and holistic approach’ which emphasises support to 
communities ‘from the ground up’ and, establishing strong multi-agency relationships 
with key people in education, social services, child and adolescent mental health 
teams, to start to share information,  work together on positive interventions and think 
long-term (HM Government 2018; WHO 2015). 
Although not an entirely new way of dealing with social problems, what is 
strategic in the public health approach is the emphasis that is placed on  
“the full participation of communities to engender a sense of ownership of this 
problem and solutions [ ] to empower people and their communities to see 
violence not as an inevitable consequence of modern life but as a problem that 
can be understood and changed” (Mercy et al. 1993, p. 8).  
This approach in collective efficacy is believed to have the potential for greater impact 




This chapter examines the concept of community resilience in countering 
radicalisation and highlights the importance of the need for Europe to consider 
making more effective use of their minority ethnic law enforcement (LEA) officers in 
community engagement activities to enhance community resilience in the fight 
against radicalisation and other CVE activities that are specifically linked to minority 
ethnic groups and their communities. It is argued that building ‘social connection’ 
through the harnessing and enhancement of the role and participation of minority 
ethnic police officers in counter-terrorism activities can provide the much needed 
effective community engagement to build resilience through genuine culturally 
sensitive partnerships that are based on trust and confidence (see Ellis and Abdi 
2017).  
 
10.2 Defining Community Resilience 
The concept of community is a contested one with different meanings imposed by 
different disciplines; but, central to these different definitions of community is a sense 
of ‘belonging’ either (I) in a geographical sense, for example through a 
neighbourhood or, (II) socially, whereby people who hold the same interests, social 
leanings, sexualities, ideologies, religions or cultural values identify themselves as 
belonging to specific or recognisable communities that may transcend geographical or 
even international  boundaries (Cooper 2008; Hillary 1955). Community is 
increasingly being recognised as a social phenomenon whereby particular social 
groups, ‘bound’ together by their histories, ‘race’ religions and cultures  commonly 
refer to themselves as communities ‘undivided’ by geographical boundaries.     
Resilience is an equally complex concept. From its roots in psychology and 
psychopathology, the term has grown and has become contextualised in many 
different ways by many disciplines including social policy, politics, engineering, 
youth studies, urban studies and medicine.  Central to the definitions of resilience is 
the idea of having the ability or capacity to withstand adversity or disaster or having 
the ability to ‘bounce back’ after experiencing significant adversity or being able to 
function well ‘despite the odds’.  In humans, resilience was primarily defined as an 
individual attribute conceptualised in terms of personal traits and capabilities to 
manipulate risk and protective factors in order to overcome adversity. The concept 
has developed over the years and is now commonly regarded not as an individual 
attribute but the outcome of a process of systematic interaction between the individual 
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and the wider socio-cultural or environmental influences (see Ungar 2008; 2011).  
There is now an overwhelming acceptance of the fact that resilience is culturally 
relative concept and that much depends on the quality of the interaction to achieve it 
(Ungar 2008; Ungar et al. 2005),  
Michael Ungar defined resilience as the product of strategic and positive 
relationship between the individual and resource providers, (for example, state 
services, welfare support agencies, NGOs, LEAs etc) to enable a community to 
overcome an adversity (Ungar 2011). In this relationship, the individual must 
demonstrate capabilities in terms of having skills, abilities or willingness to want to 
overcome the defined adversity; and, the resource providers must provide resources to 
meet these needs or desires. What is important is that the resources must be provided 
in a culturally meaningful way so that the individual will naturally ‘navigate’ towards 
them.  Most important in this resource-focused relationship is that what is finally 
decided as the requirements to ‘bounce back’ recover from or overcome the adversity 
are ‘negotiated’ and agreed. In this definition of resilience, therefore, the individual is 
'empowered', supported and encouraged to achieve a desired goal. For an extended 
discussion of community resilience, see Chapter 9. 
The key ideas in Ungar’s (2011) definition are: (I) the existence of particular 
relevant individual skills and capabilities – a definitive or genuine desire to want to 
overcome an adversity or social problem (II) the existence of resource providers who 
are able to provide resources (support) not in a generic terms but in a manner that is 
culturally meaningful to the recipienst, (III) the ability of individuals to navigate to 
these resources. This implies that the individuals are aware that these resources are 
there, accept them as desirable resources and are able to ‘navigate’ towards them 
willingly and without fear of discrimination; and (IV) what is finally agreed must be 
negotiated in a manner that is fair and culturally acceptable. Because the process is 
negotiated and agreed, the chances of resilience occurring are high.  
This chapter adopts Ungar's (2011) concept of resilience and applies it to 
communities. Community resilience is the ability of a community to 'bounce back' 
from a position of adversity or overcome a significant crisis or problem; that ability 
being the outcome of a process in which community capabilities are harnessed and 
supported by the provision of outside resources designed to enable the community to 
recover from adversity or rebuild itself. The chapter concurs with the view that 
resilience will not occur where resources to support community ability to recover are 
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not presented in a culturally acceptable manner and, more importantly, not negotiated 
bottom-up but 'imposed' top-down. The willingness to 'want to bounce back' must be 
present and the resources to support this must be culturally meaningful. This 
definition of community resilience rejects the notion that resilience is the individual 
and specific attribute of a community. No community can be by itself resilient, 
however coherent, strong or determined the community is to overcome its problems. 
Resilience is not simply about self-discipline or self-determination; the concept is 
used in this chapter to refer to situations where the adversity to be confronted requires 
significant efforts beyond what the community, by itself, can handle; for example, 
tackling violent extremism or a significant physical disaster.  
It is important that the ability or willingness to recover (capabilities) is 
identifiable and recognised or even measurable, and the resources provided must not 
override but support these community competences such that the community feels 
valued, empowered and enabled through effective partnership and participation to 
work towards rebuilding their communities. The community ‘navigates’ to these 
resources not because (I) they are there (II) they are provided by government agencies 
or through outside organisations that are known for particular relevant skills or 
expertise in dealing with the relevant problems; or (III) they are provided by those 
who claim to have worked with comparable communities in the past (e.g. NGOs or 
Third Sector organisations, civil rights organisations etc with a ‘track record’ of 
similar work).  ‘Navigation’ will only take place where the community has trust and 
confidence in the resource providers who, on their part, must also have the necessary 
cultural knowledge and competence. Trust and confidence in an organisation can 
emerge from the fact that the organisation has shown genuine interest in past 
community affairs, for example, on issues that involve the community’s welfare or 
safety to the point that they are valued and respected by the community.  
 
10.2.1 Community capabilities 
The capacity or capability of communities in the context of resilience can be defined 
in terms of social capital or community competence, including having a sense of 
commitment to the community (see Ellis and Abdi 2017). Social capital is defined by 
Heywood as “the levels of trust and sense of social connectedness that help to 
promote stability, cohesion and prosperity; what turns the 'I' into 'we'” (cited in 
Newman et al, p.379). Norris et al. (2008, p.139) articulate that social capital consists 
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of three social psychological elements as follows: sense of community, place 
attachments and citizen participation.  Sense of community refers to the way in which 
communities share concerns and values and is bound by a high level of interest in 
community issues coupled with engrained sense of community service and respect 
(Sonn and Fisher 1998). Place attachment is linked to a sense of community and 
infers an emotional connection to a neighbourhood. For Perkins et al. (2002), place 
attachments are integral to need for communities to regenerate and therefore critical 
to community resilience. Citizen participation is the engagement of community 
members within support groups or formal organisations and support networks.  In 
addition to this social connectedness, there must be optimism, hope and positive 
social intelligence; namely, being able to identify and define the community’s needs 
in practical terms and make meaningful demands on needed resources.    
Ganor and Ben-Lavy (2013) also identified community leadership as a key 
requirement of community resilience – a leadership that is authentic and grassroots; 
one that has credibility because it comes from within the community and truly 
represents its uniqueness and aspirations. However, the definition of community 
leadership has to be strategic as different groups within a community may identify 
with different leaders or leadership structures. Most important, perhaps, is the ability 
of a community to organise themselves, and work together to identify and prioritise 
goals in a realistic and achievable manner (Ellis and Abdi 2017; Ganor and Ben-Lavy 
2013; Norris et al 2008). 
The fact that a community has these attributes does not mean that it is resilient. 
It simply means that it has the ingredients (capabilities) within it that can enable it to 
address problems or ‘bounce back’ from a position of adversity. Communities will 
need support to build social bonding and a strong social identity through effective 
partnership and engagement with resource providers or agencies with skills and 
competences to bolster individual and community identity, alleviate fears and 
misconceptions, encourage social bridging and promote inclusion and positive 
attitudes (Al Raffie 2013; Spalek 2013; Weine 2012; Schanzer et al. 2010). Studies 
undertaken by Ellis et al. (2014; 2016) indicate that social bridging can be associated 
with less openness to violence.  What is important in this relationship is the cultural 
competence of the resource providers. There is a basic requirement of understanding 
and appreciation of cultural nuances and/or religious practices many of which cannot 
be gained by simply reading a book or research reports written by ‘outsiders’. 
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Furthermore, provisions must aim at being as inclusive as possible; including 
underrepresented populations as well as those in the majority (Gaynor and Ben-Lavy 
2013). As indicated above, trust and confidence in the service providers are also very 
crucial to community resilience. Also, see Chap 9.  
 
10.2.2. Cultural Competence 
It is the position of this chapter that the ability of external resource providers to 
provide community resources that are adequate enough to build community resilience 
to counter radicalisation will depend very much on their cultural competence. 
Organisations or agencies that claim to have ‘professional’ knowledge but are not 
culturally aware are most likely to engage badly and the process of negotiation will be 
weak as trust and confidence of the community will be lacking. Cultural competence 
includes having cultural knowledge and understanding of the life experiences of the 
different ethnicities, religions and faiths in the community and also of lifestyles, for 
example, minority ethnic youth cultures.  Cultural competence is more effective if 
based on cultural affiliations (for example, where the providers are of the same 
ethnicity or religion) but, in addition, there must be an existing relationship whereby 
the provider had, in the past, shown genuine interest in the affairs of the community 
though help and support given during past crisis situations.  
 
10.3 Engaging communities to foster resilience against radicalisation: 
Fostering community resilience as a form of disaster readiness has been adopted in 
the UK where the emphasis is on 
 ‘informing engaging and empowering communities’ with specific reference to 
‘not creating or identifying a whole new community network or a one off 
response to a recovery from an incident, but rather an ongoing process of using 
and enhancing existing relationships to better improve the emergency 
preparedness of an area’ (Cabinet Office 2016, p.8).  
 
In its Inquiry into Radicalisation, the UK Home Affairs Select Committee (HM 
Government, 2017 HC 135) recommended the importance of building a resilience 
programme aimed at enabling 
young people better develop critical skills required to be conscious of 
manipulation and grooming and to actively question information they receive –
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both offline and online. It is only when they are equipped with these skills that 
they will be able to develop the resilience and tenacity necessary to deal with 
the complex issues of faith, identity. (HM Government 2017 HC135, p.39) 
 
Positively, the Select Committee recognised the importance of external factors in 
building community resilience and therefore specifically recommended that 
programmes to build community resilience to counter radicalisation must be 
developed in conjunction with community organisations, policing bodies and 
education experts (For UK Government response to the Select Committee report, see 
HM Government, 2017). 
The UK Government’s response to the Select Committee recommendation on 
resilience was the passing of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act (2015) which 
introduced (in section 26), as part of the state Prevent agenda, a general duty, known 
as the ‘prevent duty’, on specified public bodies enjoining them to have, in the 
exercise of their duties, due regard to the need to prevent people from being 
radicalised or drawn into terrorism. These specific public bodies include local 
authorities, criminal justice agencies, health and social care providers, childcare and 
educational institutions (Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2017 Cm 
955:16). 
Generally, the UK Prevent agenda is structured on the realization of the need to 
utilize or enhance community resilience though the involvement of a variety of 
agencies in the tackling of radicalization in communities where the potential for 
radicalisation is believed to be high (HM Government 2008; 2011). Prevent has been 
criticised on a number of fronts (See Mohammed and Siddiqui 2013). One of the key 
criticisms is that the decisions on the resources that are needed in targeted 
communities to booster resilience in order to counter radicalisation are not negotiated 
with communities but imposed by central government or local authorities on the basis 
of official understanding or ‘expert’ views on the causes of radicalisation.  
Community competence in terms of community willingness to tackle radicalisation is 
often not recognised as these are communities that should not be trusted (Kundnani 
2007). Instead, engagement with ‘suspect communities’ has been mainly through their 
professed community and faith leaders. However, the bulk of Prevent work, for 
example, with ‘vulnerable’ youths is often done without these leaders but 
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‘professionally’ by agencies who operate within their own defined professional 
knowledge of ‘youth issues’.  
A positive point in favour of Prevent is the recognition of the need to see 
radicalisation as a ‘health issue’ and to encourage the participation of a variety of 
agencies or organisations to work alongside law enforcement and security agencies in 
order to build community resilience where it is believed that opportunities to embrace 
violent extremist ideologies are high and therefore, radicalisation is an issue.  It has 
not been made clear, however, how the ‘mix’ of agencies is reached for particular 
communities (presumably, Prevent activities in communities will vary depending on 
the assessment of ‘needs’) and the nature and extent of community involvement in the 
process is not adequately documented. As it is not always clear how much of Prevent 
inputs have been negotiated with the communities, the issue of navigation on the part 
of communities is problematic. If ‘navigation’ had taken place (judged in terms of 
‘participation’ by communities in Prevent activities) it is often not clear how much of 
the ‘navigation’ is voluntary in which case community empowerment is also 
problematic. Most importantly, it is often not clear whether the skills and capabilities 
within the communities have been properly assessed or utilised. Instead, decisions are 
often made in terms of perceived needs of target groups (young people) and what 
research has revealed on the causes and routes to radicalisation.  Thus the 
agencies/service providers become the custodians of what radicalisation is (not what 
the communities think that it is) and the solutions are ‘professionally’ defined.  
A great omission in the Prevent approach to tackling radicalisation, however, is 
the assumption that communities acknowledge the legitimacy of the agencies/service 
providers that have been chosen or that they recognise and accept them. In Prevent, 
professionalism seems to override the need for cultural competency, trust and 
confidence. More important is the fact that the role of LEAs in Prevent is not well 
defined. Service providers/agencies working on Prevent activities in a community are 
likely to be seen as working for the police or the government. This ‘dual role’, which 
is not unknown, to communities, has led, to Prevent activities being seen by some 
communities as government’s ‘snooping’ exercises (Kundnani 2007; 2014; Spalek 
2013; Lambert 2011).  
Nevertheless, LEAs and security agencies are central to counter-radicalisation 
and CVE activities in EU and other countries. What is important is how this 
significant role is defined. In the UK as in most EU countries, the role of LEAs in 
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building community resilience to counter radicalisation is not clearly stated but 
loosely defined in various forms, under the general umbrella of community policing or 
police-community engagement. Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) do not normally 
have specific community resilience agendas to counter radicalisation.  It is doubtful 
whether communities expect LEAs to be helpful in re-building communities and 
offering social support, for example, to young people who are prone to being 
radicalised. LEAs have historically been seen as agents of governments and therefore 
cannot be seen as helping those who harbour revolutionary or anti-state views. 
 
10.4 ‘Race’ and Criminal Justice 
There has been a longstanding push on diversity in the UK Criminal Justice System 
(CJS) which is underpinned by the notion that the CJS should reflect the community it 
serves (McPherson 1999; Scarman 1981). This is on the basis that a diverse 
workforce is thought to be better able to understand the issues and needs facing 
diverse communities and therefore able to improve BAME trust and confidence in the 
CJS (OCJR 2005a; Confidence Unit 2003; Bowling and Philips 2002). It is felt that 
this will have a knock on effect on encouraging people to report crime, come forward 
as victims and witnesses, stay with the prosecution process and participate as jurors 
(OCJR 2005b).  Most importantly, in relation to BAME communities, a diverse 
workforce is perceived as creating the perception of fairness in the CJS through the 
involvement of BAME staff (HM Government 2007; Home Office 2005). For a 
discussion on how judicial systems might contribute to counter-radicalisation efforts, 
see Cap 8.  
In the aftermath of the 9/11 and more specifically after the 7/7 London terrorist 
attacks, the need to draw up an ethnically diversified CJS, particularly in the police, 
have gained grounds in UK Government narratives on tackling radicalisation and the 
perceived proneness to violent extremisms particularly in Muslim communities 
(Johnson 2016; Spalek 2013; Lambert 2011; Kundnani 2007; 2014; Innes 2006). As a 
result, the majority of CJS agencies in the UK have developed and to a lesser extent 
sustained various forms of governance arrangements with diverse communities and in 
particular Muslim communities aimed at improving confidence, fairness and 
professional standards (Lammy 2017; Myhill 2012; Braithwaite 2009; Taylor 2003). 
Whereas the UK government acknowledges the contributions that BAME staff of CJS 
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and other agencies could play in tackling radicalisation through effective community 
engagement, there have been no strategic guidelines on how this can be done. 
However, previous research in several areas of the criminal justice system has 
shown that minority ethnic peoples’ confidence in the system is more likely to be high 
where criminal justice practitioners that they interact with are from the same ethnic 
groups (see Calverley et al. 2004). Compared with the other UK criminal justice 
agencies (e.g the British probation service),  it is yet to be ascertained whether or not 
the involvement of BAME police officers has had any impact on crime prevention in 
the UK despite the efforts that have been made to increase recruitment of BAME 
officers since the 1981 Scarman report was published. Although general public 
surveys have been carried out that, including members of BAME communities, that 
showed general public satisfaction in policing, (Clancy et al, 2001; Green et al, 2004), 
the findings have not been linked to the ethnic composition of police officers nor to 
the specific activities of BAME officers.  
 
10,5  UK  Minority Ethnic Police Officers involvement in counter radicalisation. 
In a report in 2006, the Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities 
(OHCNM) noted that in some countries there was an absence of institutional 
mechanisms to support the interaction and co-operation between police and persons 
belonging to national minorities. This, it claimed was  
“the result of lack of appropriate training for operation in a multi-ethnic 
society, an often mono-ethnic composition of the police service and 
discriminatory practices, police have generated negative reactions among 
national minority communities in a number of situations and even become a 
conflict catalyst”  (OHCNM 2006, p.1).  
 
The report argued that good policing in multi-ethnic societies is dependent on: 
 
“the establishment of a relationship of trust and confidence, built on regular 
communication and practical co-operation, between the police and the 
minorities. All parties benefit from such a relationship. The minorities benefit 
from policing which is more sensitive to their concerns and more responsive to 
their requirements for personal protection and access to justice. The police 
benefit from greater effectiveness, since good communication and co-
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operation are keys to effective policing in any community. The state benefits 
both from the integration of minorities and from the greater effectiveness of its 
policing” (OHCNM 2006, p.3) (see also Macpherson 1999; Scarman 1981).  
 
It has long been recognised that minority police officers can play a significant role in 
building bridges with black, Asian and minority ethnic (BAME) communities and by 
so doing play a key role in crime prevention generally. This view has also been 
extended to counter-terrorism specifically. In a significant study in London, Basia 
Spalek found that Muslim police officers who were members of the Muslim Contact 
Unit (MCU), a counter-terrorism policing unit formed in the aftermath of 9/11 by 
members of the Metropolitan Police special branch, were instrumental in building 
bridges with members of Muslim communities, and developing trusting relationships 
(see Spalek 2010). Whereas these officers brought ‘cultural and religious 
understanding’ to the MCU, the success of their engagement with these communities 
depended much on their religious credibility in the community and community trust 
and respect. Gaining trust and confidence is a key issue especially as those who are 
most likely to embrace violent Islamic doctrines and bent on radicalising others are 
likely to see police officers as enemies of Islam and Muslim police officers involved 
in counterterrorist community policing as hypocrites.  This problem is likely to be 
more acute in communities where anti-police or anti-state sentiments are already high.   
Spalek (2010) also highlighted the dilemma of the Muslim officers who were 
engaged in counter-terrorism in Muslim communities in terms of whether, as 
Muslims, they had trust and confidence in the aims and objectives of the counter 
terrorism operations that they were being asked to engage in and the fear of reprisals 
if they were not trusted by members of the community.  Most important was the 
question of whether these Muslim police officers felt that they had other skills or 
'resources' that could usefully be drawn upon when building trust with Muslim 
communities other than the simple fact that they were Muslims. Given the 
opportunity, would minority police officers have taken a different approach to 
community counter-terrorism? Spalek (2010) concluded (at p. 809) that Muslim 
police officers can play an important role in community-based counter-terrorism 
policing but the involvement of Muslim police officers is still a complex issue.    
Nevertheless, the number of Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) police 
officers engaged in community counter-terrorism work in the UK is extremely low. 
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The apparent paucity of BAME police officers and particularly Muslim officers and 
staff in counter radicalisation was noted in the House of Commons, Home Affairs 
Committee on Leadership and Standards in the Police (2013) with the 
recommendation that 
police forces must recognise that diversity is more than simply ticking a 
political correctness box: true representation is critical for public acceptance 
and knowledge of communities and different mind-sets can bring real 
operational advantage as well as everyday improvements in relation to the 
public.  (House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee 2013, p. 31) 
 
Two years later, at the oral evidence session presented to the House of Commons 
Home Affairs Committee on Counter-Terrorism, following the case of three girls who 
were believed to have travelled to Syria to join ISIL (House of Commons Home 
Affairs Committee 2015, HC 933), the issue of the underrepresentation of BAME 
police officers in counter-terrorism activities, especially in the context of Prevent, was 
also raised.  The Committee made reference to former Metropolitan Police Chief 
Superintendent Dal Babu's comments in the press that “the lack of Muslim staff in the 
ranks of the Prevent scheme is hampering efforts to stop vulnerable young people, 
particularly women, from travelling to Syria to join Islamic State.” (The London 
Evening Standard 2015:1). 
The Committee agreed to the need to increase police diversity in counter-
terrorism, especially in the area of prevent; referring, again, to Dai babu’s comment in 
the press that “If you are going to fight terrorism effectively then your key operatives 
need to reflect the people that you are dealing with and that is not happening here” 
(cited in House of Commons Home Affairs Committee 2015, p. 7) Low numbers and 
not being in position of strategic command imply that very little is known about 
black, Asian and minority ethnic officers real contributions to the UK’s counter 
radicalisation Prevent programme.  
 
10.6 The UK Black and Muslim Police Associations and networks 
The UK National Black Police Association (NBPA) was formed in 1998 as a 
result of pressures within British police forces for a fairer deal for BAME police 
officers and staff and for race to be taken seriously in the work of British police 
forces.  The aims of the association are:  
13 
 
to seek to improve the working environment of Black staff by protecting the 
rights of those employed within the Police Service and to enhance racial 
harmony and the quality of service to the Black community of the United 
Kingdom, thereby assisting the Police Service in delivering a fair and equitable 
service to all sections of the community" (see http://www.nbpa.co.uk/). 
 
The organisation’s objectives are:   
1. To advise, consult and intervene on matters of racism nationally, which 
could have negative effects on communities.  
2. To work towards improving relationships between the Police and Black, 
Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) communities within the United 
Kingdom.  
3. To influence the direction of policies nationally and in line with equality 
issues and anti-discrimination.  
4. To work towards improving the recruitment, retention and progression of 
officers and police staff members within the police service.  
 
The organisation currently has 13,000 members including uniformed police officers, 
police community safety officers (PCSOs) and other police civilian staff. 
 
There is evidence that the BPA and the Muslim Police Association’s (MPA) 
have been working with UK’s BAME communities in various ways to build trust and 
confidence in the police and prevent crime and anti-social behaviour. For example, 
the Metropolitan arm of the National Black Police Association (the MBPA) has been 
active in London in the Met’s efforts to engage with BAMEs in the inner cities. What 
is significant is that ‘engagement’ has not been strictly in the context of law 
enforcement but also by showing interest in these communities through, for example, 
the initiation of positive activities for young people or  being present whenever there 
was a crisis, to show solidarity and provide support and safeguarding to those in need. 
For example:  
 
 In the case of the murdered schoolboy, Damilola Taylor (2000), the BPA 
played a significant role in sourcing officers to engage with the local black 
community in Peckham, South East London; this helped to secure the eventual 
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conviction of the perpetrators of the crime.  
 In the aftermath of the Grenfell Tower Fire in London (14th of June 2017), the 
Met BPA organized its members to undertake voluntary patrols in the area to 
provide support to the community as part of the disaster relief effort. 
 In the aftermath of Hurricane Irma, in the Caribbean and the Bahamas (30th of 
August -13
th
 of September 2017) the Met BPA organized its members to 
ensure that they were part of the UK disaster relief effort to the affected 
countries.  
 
This approach of being involved and showing interest in the problems of BAME 
communities, strengthens trust and confidence and builds the foundation for effective 
engagement, when the organisation then shows up in other areas, such as helping to 
counter radicalisation. Engagement based on having specific 'expertise' and/or track 
record of 'relevant' work - for example,  by agencies or faith-based groups and 
institutions that have worked with BAME communities and groups is likely to be less 
effective especially where these organisations show up as ‘crisis managers’ not 
friends of the community. These agencies may command respect because they are 
‘known’ or have been named by governments, trust and confidence in them may be an 
issue. Unfortunately, the majority of agencies involved in community based CVE 
work belong to this category.  
Communities have never had a say in who is selected to help them solve their 
problems, especially crime and violence problems. Needless to mention is the fact 
that no negotiation is done to ensure that what is being provided by the agencies are 
acceptable to the communities concerned.  It is no wonder that communities have 
complained about the relevance of CVE/Prevent activities and negative perceptions 
have prevailed especially in Muslim communities about the overall intention of 
Prevent - to demonise Muslim communities (Kundnani 2007).  It is reasonable to 
assume that 'navigation' to the resources provided by these agencies will be poor; 
hence, resilience is not happening in these communities even though there are 
elements within these communities who are genuinely committed to tackling 
radicalisation.  
The position taken in this chapter is that the role of BAME LEA practitioners 
should be explored as a mechanism to boost community resilience. They are a 
15 
 
valuable form of social capital. Our on-going work with the National Black and Asian 
Police Association has highlighted that the ‘added value’ that they bring into British 
policing is being under-utilised. We believe that they could do more in terms of 
engagement with Muslim communities and, possibly, contribute significantly in the 
fight against radicalisation; their cultural competences and having an engagement 
approach that is directed at building the trust and confidence of the community 
becomes useful when they are seen as being involved in counter-terrorism activities. 
 
10.7. Discussion  
Resilience is a social interactive process the outcome of which is often associated 
with the successful adaption to or recovery from adversity’ (Pfefferbaum et al. 2015; 
Pfefferbaum et al. 2005; 2014).The term is used in the context of being in a position 
of adversity from which the individual is required to ‘bounce back’, recover or 
experience improved health or social conditions. Resilience is not an individual 
attribute but the end product of a course in which individual attributes or capabilities 
are harnessed through the provision of resources in a manner that makes perfect 
sense, sensible or culturally meaningful so that the individual will feel empowered 
and will naturally navigate to these resources and it is in this process that resilience 
occurs (see Ungar 2008; 2011). 
 
RESILIENT COMMUNITIES 
Ready to tackle adversity/crisis (e.g. radicalisation) 
 
 
                                           Positive Resource Focused Relationship 
       (Negotiation) 
 
 
Navigation     Provision/Policy 
                     (Empowerment)                                           (Cultural Competence)
         
           Trust Hope Agency 
           Confidence Optimism 
      Positive Social Intelligence     
      Partnership 
        (Historic Relationship) 
 
 
Fig One: Building Community Resilience to tackle radicalisation 
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It is argued in this chapter that resilience is not an inherent attribute of a 
community; it is a process of strategic interaction between the community and 
resource providers/agencies in a culturally sensitive and mutually agreed use of 
resources to build the necessary platform (resilience) to tackle the adversity or 
problem.  Community resilience in the context of tackling radicalisation is the process 
whereby community capabilities are harnessed through a process of engagement and 
negotiation with resource providers; it is based on trust and confidence and the 
cultural competency of the service providers. It is argued that communities will 
naturally 'navigate' to these resources and will see them as empowering if their 
cultural relevance is made clear. Figure one explains this process, diagrammatically.  
 
Community resilience, therefore, is an acknowledgement that communities have 
competences or capabilities that can be harnessed to address an adversity (e.g. 
radicalisation) and that resources to help the communities are acceptable to the 
communities and have been negotiated so that both the communities and resource 
providers are partners in the joint effort of tackling radicalisation.    
In this chapter, staff associations within the British Police, namely the Black 
Police Associations and the Asian and Muslim Police Association, were used as 
examples of LEA groups that work within a law enforcement/CVE agenda but have 
developed effective engagement with BAME communities in London and other parts 
of the UK by showing interest in BAME communities and supporting them in times 
of crisis. In addition, these LEA officers have the cultural competence that is crucial 
to counter-terrorism efforts. Unfortunately, however, the skills of these officers are 
not being harnessed by the UK police. In spite of the acknowledgement that BAME 
officers are disproportionally underrepresented in counter-terrorism duties, (House of 
Commons Home Affairs Committee 2015, HC 933), no efforts have yet been made to 
rectify this.   
Whereas some studies have highlighted some of the problems that may occur 
where Muslim police officers  are utilised in Prevent duties in Muslim communities 
(Spalek 2010), the Metropolitan Police’s effort highlighted in that study is a 
recognition of the fact that a Prevent /counter-terrorism activity in Muslim 




There are no quick solutions to radicalisation. Developing community resilience 
to tackle radicalisation will take time, sustained resources and effort. However, there 
is a very real potential that focusing on making communities resilient to 
radicalisation, though engagement, partnership, harnessing community competences 
and providing culturally sensitive resources, could restore community confidence in 
state approaches to radicalisation because of the very simple fact that communities are 
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